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Regulating innovative health technologies: dialectics, dialogics, and the 33 
case of faecal microbiota transplants 34 
This paper interrogates the common characterisation of innovative health 35 
technologies “leading”, while law and regulation “lag” behind. We analysed the 36 
case of faecal microbiota transplants (FMT), an innovative procedure whose 37 
regulatory status remains in flux worldwide. We searched the literature for papers 38 
that described the regulation of FMT, and coded these according to a simple 39 
analytic framework. We identified 21 relevant papers. To date, no jurisdiction has 40 
implemented FMT-specific regulation. Instead, FMT is dealt with under a range 41 
of approaches, which include fitting it within existing regulation, and the use of 42 
“soft” law. We found that metaphor, or argument by analogy, played a central 43 
role in delineating the potential regulatory options. We also found the 44 
relationship between innovation and regulation to be more dialogue than race. 45 
These findings are important because they suggest a less oppositional starting 46 
point in discussions of how innovative health technologies should be regulated. 47 
Keywords: regulation; innovation; health technology; faecal microbiota 48 
transplant 49 
 50 
1. Introduction 51 
The relationship between innovative health technologies and the law is often 52 
characterised as one in which technology leads, while the law is “outpaced”, “lagging” 53 
or “limping” behind.1 Innovation in health, as in other domains, is seen as a fluid, fast-54 
 
1 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The 
Example of in Vitro Fertilization’ (2005) 6 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & 
Technology 505, 516; Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Agents of Change: How the Law “Copes” with 
Technological Change’ (2011) 20 Griffith Law Review 763, 764; Dianne Nicol and others, 
paced process, dependent on flexible, open-ended thinking, and a tolerance for risk and 55 
uncertainty. Laws and other forms of regulation, by contrast, are often regarded as static 56 
systems, slow to adapt and rigid once in place. In this characterisation, the goals of 57 
regulation – protecting patient safety, ensuring access to effective therapies, controlling 58 
public spending on healthcare, and promoting the ethical conduct of researchers and 59 
clinicians – can appear to frustrate the translational goals of innovative health research 60 
and development. This kind of relationship can be described as dialectical: regulation is 61 
seen to oppose or block innovation; then, in the struggle of competing forces, new 62 
forms of regulation emerge, only to be later challenged by further innovations.   63 
This dialectical dynamic – opposition, followed by synthesis and then further 64 
opposition – has previously played out in the context of innovations such as IVF, human 65 
gene therapy, autologous stem cell therapies and embryonic stem cell research. It is 66 
currently manifest in debates around precision medicine technologies such as genome 67 
editing using the CRISPR-Cas9 system, drug/diagnostic pairs, and 3D bioprinting. This 68 
dynamic is important because it shapes and constrains the range of regulatory responses 69 
which are deemed possible, in response to innovation. In the 2014-16 debates 70 
surrounding the UK’s Medical Innovation Bill, for example, the bill’s proponent Lord 71 
Saatchi argued that the common law was stifling medical innovation by imposing too 72 
stringent a test of negligent liability on doctors.2 He proposed that a legal exemption be 73 
created for doctors so they would face no liability in negligence for performing 74 
 
‘Precision Medicine: Drowning in a Regulatory Soup?’ (2016) 3 Journal of Law and the 
Biosciences 281. 
2 Medical Innovation Bill 2014 (UK). 
innovative therapies, under certain conditions.3 While the bill ultimately failed, 75 
discourse surrounding it exemplified the belief that regulation and innovation are 76 
diametrically opposed to one another; it was argued that the laws had a negative effect 77 
on medicine as they could not accommodate innovation.4 78 
The premise of this paper is that the relationship between innovative health 79 
technologies and the law should not be presumed to be dialectical, but is rather a matter 80 
for empirical investigation in each new case. We use the case study of faecal microbiota 81 
transplantation to put this the relationship between innovation and regulation under the 82 
microscope. Is there a lag between the two? What is the reason for the lag? Through 83 
what kinds of strategies do laws and other regulation seek to “catch up” with 84 
technology? And how could these be improved? To what degree do the forms of 85 
regulation contribute to or guide the emergence of innovation?  86 
We begin by defining the key concepts, “innovative health technology” and 87 
“laws and other forms of regulation”. We then explain how faecal microbiota 88 
transplantation fits our criteria for an innovative health technology, and how it is 89 
currently regulated. Finally, we outline our approach to the case study, which uses 90 
qualitative content analysis of scholarly papers, and set out our findings. This study 91 
leads us to suggest that, in this case at least, the encounter between innovative health 92 
technologies and the law is more dialogic than dialectic: more a dialogue than a race. 93 
 
3 Ibid s 1. 
4 Bernadette Richards and others, ‘The Medical Innovation Bill: Still More Harm than Good’ 
(2015) 10 Clinical Ethics 1. Instead of the Bill, the UK Parliament passed the Access to 
Medical Treatments (Innovation) Act 2016 (UK), which allowed for the creation of a register 
of innovative treatments. 
We found that regulatory pathways were determined at key decision-points, one of the 94 
most important of which was the choice of analogy to describe regulatory interactions. 95 
That is: based on key characteristics, which existing technology, or technologies, does 96 
the new technology resemble? We conclude by noting some implications of our 97 
findings for the regulation of innovative health technologies more broadly. 98 
2. Framing the case study: key context and concepts 99 
(a) What are innovative health technologies? 100 
All health technologies involve “the application of organized knowledge and skills in 101 
the form of devices, medicines, vaccines, procedures and systems developed to solve a 102 
health problem and improve quality of lives”.5 We define innovative health technologies 103 
as having two additional characteristics. First, they are radically new. They represent a 104 
paradigm shift, and “open up new possibilities and allow us to do things that haven’t 105 
been done before,” as opposed to being merely “a variation or extension or 106 
improvement on something we can already do”.6 Secondly, they are health technologies 107 
at an early or investigational stage of their life cycle, with their full range of 108 
applications not yet fully understood. They are “still emergent… and have not yielded 109 
many applications and societal consequences”.7 110 
 
5 World Health Assembly, Resolution on health technologies, WHA60.29, 60th World Health 
Assembly, 2007; available online at 
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/WHA60_29.pdf?ua=1 (accessed March 2019). 
6 David Hunter, ‘How to Object to Radically New Technologies on the Basis of Justice: The 
Case of Synthetic Biology’ (2013) 27 Bioethics 426.  
7 Philip AE Brey, ‘Anticipatory Ethics for Emerging Technologies’ (2012) 6 NanoEthics 1, 1. 
(b) What is law and other regulation? 111 
Over the past three decades, the field of regulatory scholarship has significantly 112 
reshaped our understanding of regulation, both in its meaning and in its scope. In 113 
particular, regulation is no longer considered the exclusive purview of the State and its 114 
laws: though these remain important, regulation today is widely described as 115 
“decentred”.8 What this means is that regulation is no longer top-down and linear, but 116 
rather encompasses a wide array of actors and activities, interacting within “regulatory 117 
space”.9 Regulation can take the form of formal, direct mechanisms – e.g. statutes, 118 
regulations, policies – as well as less formal, and less direct mechanisms – e.g. industry 119 
self-regulation, stakeholder forums, funding decisions. In this paper, we adopt Black’s 120 
definition of regulation, which is that “regulation, or regulatory governance, is the 121 
organised attempt to manage risks or behaviour in order to achieve a publicly stated 122 
objective or set of objectives”.10 Following Morgan and Yeung, we use the expression 123 
“laws and other forms of regulation”, or “law and regulation”, to emphasise that, as 124 
 
8 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current legal problems 103. See also 
Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press 2007) 4. 
9 Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in Robert Baldwin, Colin 
Scott and Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press 1998); 
Susan MC Gibbons, ‘Mapping the Regulatory Space’ in Andrew Smart (ed), Jane Kaye and 
others, Governing Biobanks: Understanding the Interplay between Law and Practice (Hart 
Pub 2012). 
10 Julia Black, ‘Learning from Regulatory Disasters’ (2014) 10 Policy Quarterly 3. 
legal scholars, we bring a legal perspective to this expanded view of regulation.11 In the 125 
context of innovations in health care, we are particularly interested in the impact of 126 
therapeutic goods regulation, professional ethics and discipline, tort laws, healthcare 127 
complaints, and intellectual property laws, but we recognise that these well-mapped 128 
areas of legal inquiry have roots that grow out into less well known areas of normative 129 
control. 130 
3. Qualitative content analysis 131 
(a) FMT as a case study 132 
We selected the case study of faecal microbiota transplantation (FMT) in order to 133 
investigate the ways in which innovative health technologies encounter law and 134 
regulation. Described by one of its pioneers as a therapeutic strategy “at the fringes of 135 
medicine”,12 FMT “consists of the infusion of faeces from a healthy donor to the 136 
gastrointestinal (GI) tract of a recipient patient, in order to treat a specific disease 137 
associated with alteration of gut microbiota”.13 Although its mode of action is not yet 138 
completely understood, broadly speaking, FMT treats disease by “restoring the 139 
phylogenetic diversity and microbiota more typical of a healthy person”.14 There is now 140 
a robust body of evidence to support the efficacy of FMT as a treatment for recurrent 141 
 
11 Morgan and Yeung (n 8) 14. 
12 Thomas J Borody and Alexander Khoruts, ‘Fecal Microbiota Transplantation and Emerging 
Applications’ (2012) 9 Nature Reviews Gastroenterology & Hepatology 88, 91. 
13 Giovanni Cammarota and others, ‘European Consensus Conference on Faecal Microbiota 
Transplantation in Clinical Practice’ (2017) 66 Gut 569, 569. 
14 Colleen R Kelly and others, ‘Update on Fecal Microbiota Transplantation 2015: Indications, 
Methodologies, Mechanisms, and Outlook’ (2015) 149 Gastroenterology 223, 223. 
Clostridium difficile infection (rCDI),15 an “aggressive intestinal superbug”16 in relation 142 
to which antibiotic resistance is a growing concern. In addition, FMT is under 143 
investigation for a number of other GI conditions, as well as some non-GI diseases such 144 
as diabetes. 145 
In both the rCDI indication, and other areas of investigation, FMT satisfies our 146 
criteria for an innovative health technology. While the medicinal use of faeces has been 147 
documented as far back as fourth-century China,17 FMT in its modern form has been 148 
used sporadically over the past 50 years, gaining pace in the past decade.18 However, it 149 
fits our criteria of being “radically new” in the sense that it represents a paradigm shift 150 
from the “germ theory” based therapies, such as antibiotics, which constituted the 151 
previous standard of care for rCDI.19 Instead, FMT engages with the gut microbiota as a 152 
 
15 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2014) “Faecal microbiota transplant for 
recurrent Clostridium difficile infection” (IPG485). Available online at 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ipg485 (accessed March 2019); Cammarota and others (n 
13); Benjamin H Mullish and others, ‘The Use of Faecal Microbiota Transplant as Treatment 
for Recurrent or Refractory Clostridium Difficile Infection and Other Potential Indications: 
Joint British Society of Gastroenterology (BSG) and Healthcare Infection Society (HIS) 
Guidelines’ (2018) 67 Gut 1920. 
16 Rachel E Sachs and Carolyn A Edelstein, ‘Ensuring the Safe and Effective FDA Regulation 
of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation’ (2015) 2 Journal of Law and the Biosciences 396. 
17 Kenneth A Young, ‘Of Poops and Parasites: Unethical FDA Overregulation’ (2014) 69 Food 
and Drug Law Journal 555. 
18 Borody and Khoruts (n 12), Cammarota (n 13). 
19 Alexander Khoruts and Michael J Sadowsky, ‘Understanding the Mechanisms of Faecal 
Microbiota Transplantation’ (2016) 13 Nature Reviews Gastroenterology & Hepatology 508.  
“true organ”, one that is “integral to human physiology,”20 opening up completely new 153 
treatment possibilities. It should be noted that, even in the rCDI indication – i.e., where 154 
FMT is best understood – scientists have yet to characterise the precise interactions 155 
between the human microbiome and disease and the resultant opportunities and 156 
challenges for therapeutic intervention. 157 
Moreover, FMT provides an interesting case study because the question of how 158 
it should be regulated is very much still in flux. Around the world, regulation of FMT 159 
currently runs the gamut “from non-existing to strictly regulated”.21 So far, no 160 
jurisdiction has introduced FMT-specific legislation. Instead, the following approaches 161 
have been documented: 162 
• FMT is regulated under the existing framework for biologic medicines (e.g. 163 
France); 164 
• FMT is regulated under the existing framework for biologic medicines, with some 165 
customisation (e.g. Canada, UK, USA); 166 
• No existing regulations apply, and no new regulations are enacted, but “soft law” 167 
in the form of professional guidelines fills the gaps (e.g. Austria); and 168 
• No existing regulations apply, and no new regulations are enacted, leaving gaps 169 
and lack of clarity (e.g. Australia, China). 170 
 
20 Ibid.  
21 Frederick Verbeke and others, ‘Faecal Microbiota Transplantation: A Regulatory Hurdle?’ 
(2017) 17 BMC Gastroenterology 128. 
(b) Method 171 
Using the databases MedLine, Web of Science, and HeinOnline, we searched the 172 
literature for peer-reviewed publications on FMT, published in or after 2013 (when the 173 
first randomised study of FMT in rCDI was published),22 and which included 174 
substantial discussion of legal and regulatory considerations. We used the search terms 175 
f(a)ecal microbio* transplant* AND [law* OR regulat* OR polic* OR legislat*]. We 176 
identified 21 papers that met our inclusion criteria. Most of these (n=14) were published 177 
in scientific journals; 5 were published in law journals and two in health policy 178 
journals.23 Eleven papers discussed the USA regulatory context, six related to Europe or 179 
individual European countries, there was one paper each on Australia and Canada, and 180 
two that compared international approaches. 181 
Using qualitative content analysis methodology,24 we developed a simple coding 182 
framework and extracted data in relation to the following three themes:  183 
• In relation to FMT, how do commentators characterise the goals of regulation? 184 
• What specific regulatory challenges does FMT present? 185 
• How could the regulation of FMT be improved?  186 
 
22 Els van Nood and others, ‘Duodenal Infusion of Donor Feces for Recurrent Clostridium 
Difficile’ (2013) 368 New England Journal of Medicine 407. 
23 As Lewis notes in her 2018 law review article, there has been little discussion of FMT in the 
legal literature: Myrisha S Lewis, ‘Halted Innovation: The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction 
over Medicine and the Human Body’ [2018] Utah Law Review 1073.  
24 Margrit Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice (Sage Publications 2012). 
(c) Results 187 
(i) What are the goals of regulation in relation to FMT? 188 
Beyond the general justifications for regulating health technologies, what should 189 
regulation seek to achieve specifically in relation to FMT? In this regard, most 190 
commentators drew a distinction between FMT for its established indication of rCDI, as 191 
compared with other clinical indications.25 For rCDI, commentators expressed a strong 192 
concern that regulation might inappropriately hinder access to a very effective treatment 193 
(one paper described this course of action as “inhumane”),26 while also stressing the 194 
importance of maintaining safety, e.g., through rigorous screening of donors and 195 
donated stool. For indications other than rCDI, which are still investigational, most 196 
commentators focused on the importance of encouraging responsible research and 197 
development, rather than patient access. 198 
(ii) What regulatory challenges does FMT present? 199 
Three key features of FMT were identified as creating specific regulatory challenges: 200 
the nature of the substance itself; the multiple different modes of administration 201 
available; and uncertainty regarding the longer-term effects of FMT. First, in terms of 202 
the nature of the substance, Sachs and Edelstein note that stool is “unique for the 203 
difficulty of its characterisation and the simplicity of its production, and each of these 204 
characteristics raises special safety concerns”.27 Unlike a conventional medicine, it is 205 
 
25 See for example, Carolyn A Edelstein and others, ‘The Regulation of Fecal Microbiota for 
Transplantation: An International Perspective for Policy and Public Health’ (2015) 32 
Clinical Research and Regulatory Affairs 99, 105. 
26 Verbeke and others (n 21) 6. 
27 Sachs and Edelstein (n 16) 406. 
easy to manufacture and thus obtain a “batch” of product, raising the possibility of DIY 206 
procedures, carried out outside the auspices of medicine. Yet, also unlike a conventional 207 
medicine, each “batch” – even from the same person – can differ greatly, which 208 
presents challenges in its characterisation and therefore for quality control.28 This 209 
difficulty is encapsulated by the fact that almost all commentators raised the spectre of 210 
potentially risky “YouTube FMT” – patients self-administering the procedure on the 211 
guidance of online videos. 212 
Secondly, there are multiple different ways to carry out an FMT procedure. 213 
Stool may come from a known or an unknown donor, or may be autologous, or 214 
synthetic; it may be fresh or frozen; it may be administered via enema, colonoscopy, or 215 
other means. This gives rise to multiple variables that may influence the efficacy, 216 
safety, and acceptability of FMT, and these have not yet been fully disentangled through 217 
clinical trials. While guidelines have been published in several jurisdictions, these have 218 
tended to be based on expert opinion, due to the lack of robust evidence.29 Even in 219 
rCDI, most of the available evidence for FMT comes from retrospective case series or 220 
systematic reviews,30 rather than the “gold standard” of randomised controlled trials. 221 
This informs the third feature, which is that little is known about the long-term safety 222 
 
28 Diane Hoffmann and others, ‘Improving Regulation of Microbiota Transplants’ (2017) 358 
Science 1390. See also Samuel P Costello and Robert V Bryant, ‘Faecal Microbiota 
Transplantation in Australia: Bogged down in Regulatory Uncertainty’ (2019) 49 Internal 
Medicine Journal 148, 149. 
29 Cammarota and others (n 13). 
30 SD Goldenberg, ‘Faecal Microbiota Transplantation for Recurrent Clostridium Difficile 
Infection and Beyond: Risks and Regulation’ (2016) 92 Journal of Hospital Infection 115. 
profile of FMT. In particular, the risks of transmitting communicable diseases,31 as well 223 
as non-communicable conditions including psychological illnesses,32 from the donor to 224 
the patient, remain poorly understood.  225 
(iii) How could the regulation of FMT be improved?  226 
Commentators suggested a variety of alternatives to the current regulation of FMT, in 227 
order to better achieve the identified goals (set out at 3.1) and address the identified 228 
challenges (set out at 3.2). The regulatory approach advocated by each commentator 229 
reflected the priority they gave to these goals and challenges. 230 
Several commentators suggested designating a “special status” for FMT, similar 231 
to that of blood.33 This was based on a view that the rigorous manufacturing standards 232 
applied to drugs would be unduly burdensome for an innately variable substance such as 233 
human stool.34 The blood framework was also considered well suited to addressing the 234 
communicable disease risks associated with FMT.35 Another suggested option was to 235 
classify FMT as a gene-, cell-, or tissue-like product for regulatory purposes. This was 236 
 
31 N Kapel and others, ‘Practical Implementation of Faecal Transplantation’ (2014) 20 Clinical 
Microbiology and Infection 1098, 1099. 
32 Tim Spector and Rob Knight, ‘Faecal Transplants Still Need Good Long Term Trials and 
Monitoring (Editorial)’. 
33 JC Lagier, ‘Faecal Microbiota Transplantation: From Practice to Legislation before 
Considering Industrialization’ (2014) 20 Clinical Microbiology and Infection 1112; 
Edelstein and others (n 25). 
34 Lagier (n 33); Mark B Smith, Colleen Kelly and Eric J Alm, ‘Policy: How to Regulate Faecal 
Transplants’ (2014) 506 Nature 290. 
35 Smith, Kelly and Alm (n 34). 
proposed as a means of addressing FMT risks that fall beyond the risks applicable to 237 
blood, including pre-existing risk management frameworks and clear criteria for clinical 238 
trial exemptions.36 However, in their argument against regulating FMT as a tissue, 239 
Megerlin and colleagues stressed the currently limited understanding of its mechanism 240 
of action, likened the healthy donor to a “bioreactor”, and highlighted the substance’s 241 
topographical rather than cellular origin.37 Based on these distinctions, Megerlin and 242 
colleagues argued that the appropriate regulatory paradigm for FMT was as a sui 243 
generis biological drug, rather than human tissue.38 244 
Others suggested that FMT should be regulated “like a drug,” but only in certain 245 
circumstances. Drawing on the current US system for regulating cord blood, for 246 
example, Sachs and Edelstein suggested that while FMT should be regulated as an 247 
investigational new drug for its non-approved indications, the cord blood model would 248 
be appropriate for the approved indication of rCDI. This model provides differing 249 
degrees of oversight based on both the intended recipient (autologous stool and stool 250 
donated by close relative, versus banked stool) and the intended use of stool.39 251 
Responding to the numerous variables in FMT administration, Hoffmann and 252 
colleagues proposed a “three-track regulatory system” for the USA, under which the 253 
regulation of FMT would differ depending on the product being used, and its context:40 254 
 
36 Verbeke and others (n 21). 
37 F Megerlin and others, ‘Faecal Microbiota Transplantation: A Sui Generis Biological Drug, 
Not a Tissue’ (2014) 72 Annales Pharmaceutiques Françaises 217. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Sachs and Edelstein (n 16). 
40 Hoffmann and others (n 28). 
(a) When performed by a physician, using known stool, to treat rCDI, FMT would 255 
be regulated as the practice of medicine. In indications other than rCDI, FMT 256 
would be treated as an investigational drug and regulated accordingly, unless 257 
the use meets legal requirements for “clinical innovation”. 258 
(b) When performed by a physician, using banked stool, to treat rCDI, the stool 259 
bank would be regulated like a tissue bank, with some additional oversight. 260 
(c) “Modified stool-based products” would be regulated like biological drugs. 261 
The authors note that the proposed three-track system would not require new legislation, 262 
and could be achieved with guidelines.41 The importance of guidelines, as opposed to 263 
“hard” law, was also notable in the article by Woodworth and colleagues.42 This article 264 
noted the discrepancy between the US FDA’s focus on FMT using stool from a known 265 
donor, and the empirical trend towards the use of banked stool. In order to address this, 266 
they emphasised the importance of rigorous screening protocols and stakeholder 267 
collaboration. 268 
4. Discussion 269 
By displacing established scientific and social practices, innovative health technologies 270 
create uncertainty43 and disruption.44 As a result, they may not fit – or may appear not to 271 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Michael H Woodworth and others, ‘Challenges in Fecal Donor Selection and Screening for 
Fecal Microbiota Transplantation: A Review’ (2017) 8 Gut Microbes 225. 
43 Elen Stokes, ‘Demand for Command: Responding to Technological Risks and Scientific 
Uncertainties’ (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 11. 
44 See for example, Heidi Ledford, ‘CRISPR, the Disruptor’ (2015) 522 Nature News 20. 
fit – into existing legal structures and categories. Innovative health technologies are 272 
often deemed, by the public as well as by regulators, to present risks that are 273 
qualitatively different from those addressed in existing legislation, and so can prompt 274 
calls for new, technology-specific regulations.45 Yet, as Stokes has observed, it is rare 275 
that a new technology arrives “completely ‘lawless’”.46 Rather, on arrival, innovative 276 
health technologies are met by complex webs of existing laws and other forms of 277 
regulation: the formal and informal rules which include professional norms and 278 
guidelines, legislation, regulation, policy directives, funding conditions, and so on, and 279 
which govern existing health technologies.  280 
On the basis of our findings regarding FMT, we posit that regulation does not 281 
simply react to, or compete with, innovation. While there are many illustrations which 282 
support the existence of a dialectical relationship between innovation and regulation, in 283 
the case of FMT our findings instead suggest dialogical development.47 We use this 284 
term to describe the relationship between innovation and regulation as dynamic, 285 
 
45 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Ten Dimensions of Technology Regulation: Finding Your Bearings in the 
Research Space of an Emerging Discipline’ in MEA Goodwin, BJ Koops and RE Leenes 
(eds), Dimensions of Technology Regulation (Wolf Legal Publishers 2010); Bennett Moses, 
‘Agents of Change: How the Law “Copes” with Technological Change’ (n 1). 
46 Elen Stokes, ‘Nanotechnology and the Products of Inherited Regulation’ (2012) 39 Journal of 
Law and Society 93, 94. 
47 The term “dialogic” is often used in relation to Bakhtin’s linguistic theories. According to 
Bakhtin, dialogic development occurs when language changes in response to how it has been 
used in the past, and it is also shaped by an understanding of how it may be used in the 
future: see Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Caryl Emerson ed, Michael 
Holquist tr, Austin: University of Texas Press 1981). 
relational, open-ended, and engaged in a process of constant iteration. Based on our 286 
findings above, we make three observations about the encounter between innovative 287 
health technologies and the law. We begin by noting that “innovation” is not, in fact, the 288 
object of regulation, and emphasise the importance of specificity. Secondly, we identify 289 
the centrality of metaphor in channelling discussion towards one regulatory pathway or 290 
another. Finally, we describe the ways in which these metaphors shape the dialogic 291 
relationship between innovative health technologies and regulation. 292 
(a) Regulating “innovation” 293 
One important observation from our case study of FMT is that, even where an 294 
innovative health technology is the object of regulation, “innovation” per se is not the 295 
thing being regulated. Rather, the technology’s degree of innovation derives from the 296 
convergence of other, more specific qualities, and it is these qualities that create any 297 
uncertainty, and prompt calls for new or different regulation. So, in the case of FMT, 298 
the innovation is the concept of using stool to repopulate the microbiome, as opposed to 299 
the previously standard practice of using antibiotics to address the infection. The 300 
problem facing scientists, clinicians, and regulators in this space is a specific, rather 301 
than a general one: an FMT challenge, not an “innovation” challenge. This underscores 302 
the importance of case-by-case, empirical investigation, to determine whether in fact the 303 
specific innovative technology confirms to broader narratives about innovation and 304 
regulation. 305 
(b) The “channelling” role of metaphor 306 
Our second observation relates to the central role played by metaphor, or reasoning by 307 
analogy, in discussions of how FMT should be regulated. We noted at the outset that an 308 
innovative health technology is paradigm-shifting: by definition, it is not “like” any 309 
predecessor technology. Yet, whether advocating that FMT should be regulated like a 310 
biological, like blood, or like an organ, most suggestions sought to fit FMT within an 311 
existing regulatory paradigm, based on the notion that it shares qualities with another 312 
product or process. As Megerlin and colleagues note, even the term “faecal microbiota 313 
transplant” is itself a metaphor, and not necessarily an accurate one: rather, its usage 314 
reflects the “lexical disruption” brought about by “scientific revolution”.48 Our findings 315 
suggest that the decision to compare the innovative health technology to an existing 316 
technology is in fact an important regulatory moment. In that moment, the innovative 317 
technology is “channelled” towards an existing regulatory regime based on a 318 
prioritisation of identified goals and challenges, and a process begins. 319 
(c) Dialogical development 320 
Our third observation relates to this process, which – at least in the context of FMT – is 321 
better described as a dialogue than as a “race” in which law lags behind technology. 322 
Across jurisdictions, the emergence of FMT has prompted consideration of whether 323 
existing regulation applies or is appropriate; adjustments – including in the form of 324 
screening protocols, guidelines, and subsidiary legislation – are then made, which in 325 
turn inform future developments. As Sachs and Edelstein acknowledged, even the de 326 
 
48 Megerlin and others (n 37) 3. Similarly, the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) “recognised that the enteric infusion of donor faeces is not a transplant in 
the usual sense of transplanting body tissues, but… accepted that faecal microbiota 
transplant has become an accepted term to describe this procedure”: National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (2014) “Faecal microbiota transplant for recurrent Clostridium 
difficile infection” (IPG485). Available online at https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ipg485 
(accessed March 2019). 
novo legislation option would not be pursed in a vacuum, and “must be considered in 327 
light of decisions that [regulators have] already made in this area”.49 Noting that the US 328 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had redefined its position on FMT three times, 329 
Riley and Olle perceive not regulatory lag, but an iterative process: FDA gaining 330 
“additional experience with the potential technologies before it wades into more formal 331 
rulemaking”.50 As highlighted in multiple papers, FMT is a quickly evolving therapy 332 
area, in which the different indications – and their varying strengths of evidence – are as 333 
determinative of regulatory choice as the technology itself. In this context, an iterative 334 
or dialogic understanding of regulation may in fact be the most appropriate way to 335 
“cope” with innovation.51  336 
5. Conclusion 337 
In contrast to the common characterisation of innovative technologies “leading”, while 338 
law “lags” behind, our case study revealed a less oppositional, more fluid and 339 
conversational dynamic. Regulatory dynamics, in this study, were shown to be a process 340 
rather than a given; involving incremental adjustments, trial-and-error, and mechanisms 341 
other than formal law and regulations. The extent to which these findings can be 342 
generalised to other innovative health technologies is beyond the scope of this paper. 343 
Certainly, and as we noted at the outset, there are many examples that support the 344 
traditional, dialectical framing of the relationship between regulation and innovation. 345 
However, our research shows that this is not the only possible relationship, and supports 346 
 
49 Sachs and Edelstein (n 16) 413. 
50 Margaret F Riley and Bernat Olle, ‘FDA’s Pathway for Regulation of FMT: Not so Fraught’ 
(2015) 2 Journal of Law and the Biosciences 742. 
51 Bennett Moses, ‘Agents of Change: How the Law “Copes” with Technological Change’ (n 1). 
an approach which investigates each new regulatory encounter empirically, and on its 347 
own merits. Moreover, conceiving of the relationship in dialogic terms has important 348 
implications for stakeholders, including scientists, regulators, and the public. In 349 
challenging some of the entrenched assumptions about law versus innovation, a dialogic 350 
framing may open up possibilities for a more collaborative discussion about how best to 351 
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